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ZAGZEBSKI ON POWER ENTAILMENT
William Hasker

In her book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, Linda Zagzebski
devotes considerable attention to the "power entailment principles." Acknowledging that these principles make things quite difficult for theological compatibilism, she offers three counterexamples in an attempt to show that the
principles are false. In this paper her counterexamples are refuted.

In her remarkably enjoyable book, The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge, 1 Linda Zagzebski devotes considerable attention to the so-called
"power entailment principles." Indeed, she recognizes that if any of these
principles are true this creates serious difficulties for most versions of theological compatibilism. Consider, for example, the following principle:
(PEP 1) If (a) it is within S's power to bring it about that p is true and (b)
it is within S's power to bring it about that p is false and (c) p entails
q and not-p entails not-q, then it is within S's power to bring it about
that q is true (p. 108).2

If God is essentially possessed of comprehensive foreknowledge, then
Necessarily, God believes at

t1

that I will do X at

12

if and only if I do X at

t2.

But then, if it is true (as theological compatibilists and other libertarians
believe) that my action at t2 may be free in the sense that it is within my
power either to perform it or not, it follows that I have the power to bring
about the past, namely to bring about God's past beliefs. But such powers
Zagzebski, no doubt wisely, rejects (see p. 108).
She proposes three interestingly different kinds of counterexamples to (PEP
1).3 The first of these is based on the observation that "if any necessary truths
and their negations can be brought about by anybody while others can be
brought about by nobody, all of these PEPs are false" (p. 110). Zagzebski
supposes that this is the case, and proposes to
focus on a special category of truths that may be necessary and that yet are
definitely in the category of those brought about by God. These are truths
involving God's plan of salvation. For example, consider the proposition
(11) If there is a FalI, God sends his Son to redeem the world.

God brings about the truth of (11) and it seems to me to be compatible with
the goodness of God that he not bring about (11) if he so choose. That is,
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God has the power to bring about (II) and the power to bring about the
negation of (II). But couldn't God decide to send a redeemer in any circumstances in which there was a fall? Doesn't God have the power to decide that
no matter what happened, if there was a fall, there would be a redemption?
If so, it would be the case that (II) is a necessary truth, true in all possible
worlds. And it would be a necessary truth precisely because God decided in
a certain way, a way in which he could have decided differently. But if so,
we can construct a counterexample to PEP I.
Let S = God. For q substitute the proposition God exists. For p substitute the
proposition (ll). Now, even if it is within God's power to bring it about that
(11) is true and within God's power to bring it about that (II) is false, and
even though (II) entails God exists and the negation of (II) entails It is not
the case that God exists, it is not within God's power to bring about the truth
of God exists (p. 111).

Zagzebski recognizes, of course, that her counterexample requires a nonstandard view of modal logic. She cites Descartes, along with a few others,
in support of her contention that such a non-standard view merits serious
consideration. She writes,
The modal metaphysics associated with this view deserves extensive analysis
that I cannot provide here. But for the purpose of casting doubt on the PEPs, it
is sufficient to show that those principles make common but unargued assumptions about the relation between modality and the power to choose. In the case of
divine power, I seriously doubt these assumptions are correct (pp. 112-13).

This strategy strikes me as misguided. The modal theory presupposed by
the PEPs has hardly been pulled out of a hat; rather, it is the result of a great
deal of intensive reflection on these matters, especially in the present century.
(Many readers will think of Plantinga's The Nature of Necessity.) The upshot of
this reflection (as Zagzebski acknowledges) is that most, though not quite all,
philosophers concerned with these matters have concluded that the assumptions involved in the standard view merit acceptance. The fact that these assumptions may not have been established to Zagzebski's full satisfaction is hardly
enough to constitute a serious objection to the PEPs; for that, we would need
really strong reasons for thinking something is wrong with the standard theory.
Indeed, things may be even worse for Zagzebski than these remarks indicate. Consider the following principles:
i) A proposition is necessarily true if and only if it is true in all possible
worlds.
ii) A property is essential to an individual if and only if the individual has
the property in every possible world in which the individual exists.
iii) God, God's states, and God's attributes are included in the possible

worlds rather than outside them. (I.e., a possible world is a comprehensive "way things .could be" for everything, not just for all non-divine
things.)

252

Faith and Philosophy

i-iii are not, it seems to me, substantive logical principles, on the order of
Conditional Exclusive Middle or Barcan's Formula. Rather, they are best
understood as stipulations which specify (in part) the meaning respectively
of "necessary proposition," "essential property," and "possible world." These
stipulations are of course widely accepted; indeed it is clear that Zagzebski
herself accepts them in other parts of her book. (See for example pp. 3-6.)
But given these stipulations, Zagzebski's counterexample fails. Either God
decrees in every possible world that (ll) is true, or he does not. If he does
not, then (11) is not necessary, and the example fails. If he does, then the
property of decreeing that (11) is true is one God has in all possible worlds,
and so is an essential property of God's. But it's not in God's power to shed
one of his essential properties, any more than it is in my power to divest
myself of my own essential properties. So once again, the example fails.
In view of this, it's clear that Zagzebski has a great deal of work to do if
she wants to get her counterexample taken seriously. It is not enough for her
to elaborate in detail her alternative modal theory, though that certainly needs
to be done. It's not even enough were she to conform her own usage to the
dictates of the alternative theory, instead of operating within the standard
theory as she does for the most part in her book. What she really needs to do
is to show that the standard theory is inconsistent or incoherent, and therefore
that PEPs which presuppose this theory are inadmissible.
But now suppose, completely contrary to fact, that all of this has been
done-suppose, that is, that we have come to see debilitating flaws in standard modal theory, including principles i-iii, and have been forced to accept
instead Zagzebski's alternative, according to which God has the power with
respect to some, but not all, necessary truths to make them either true or false.
Under these suppositions, (PEPI) would have been shown to be false. If all
this had actually been done, would this make things better for theological
compatibilism? Not really. For consider the principle derived from (PEPI)
by adding a fourth conjunct to the antecedent, namely "(d) p is contingent."
The resulting principle is not falsified by Zagzebski's counterexample-and
it still has the unwelcome consequence that we have power to bring about
God's past beliefs. So what has been gained?4
Zagzebski's second counterexample builds on the first but adds new elements, specifically the claim that human beings, as well as God, can have
powers that contravene the PEPs. She says
Let A be some ordinary human act that I have the power to bring about and
the power not to bring about. Suppose also that from all eternity God decided
that whenever I would do A he would do B subsequently, and that he would
do B only when I do A, and that this decision would obtain no matter what
else was the case. We need not concern ourselves with the question of whether
such a decision is determined by the divine nature or whether it is free in
some stronger sense. It matters only that I played no part in the decision
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myself. In addition, suppose that God is essentially omniscient, so it is true
in every possible world that whenever I do A God knows that I do A, and
whenever God believes that I do A, I do A. It would then be the case that

o

(I do A H God does B).

The propositions I do A and God does B would be strictly equivalent, and
their strict equivalence would be something brought about by God, not me.
Finally, suppose that I know nothing about B, am incapable of even understanding B, and therefore cannot form the intention of acting in such a way
as to bring about B.
In this case we have a counterexample to each of the PEPs. I have the power
to bring it about that I do A is true, and I have the power to bring it about
that I do A is false. I do A entails God does B and It is not the case that I do
A entails It is not the case that God does B. Yet I do not have the power to
bring it about that God does B is true. The truth of that proposition is brought
about by God. So PEP 1 is false (p. 113).
In view of our discussion of the previous example, we must reject Zagzebski's claim that "We need not concern ourselves with the question of
whether such a decision is determined by the divine nature or whether it is
free in some stronger sense." If this decision is not determined by the divine
nature, the resulting biconditional will not be true in all possible worlds and
will not be necessary. So let's suppose that the decision is determined by
God's nature. (For instance, let "A" be "I perform an act of gratuitous cruelty," and make "B" "God is displeased with my act of gratuitous cruelty.")
Given this stipulation, will the example work?
Unfortunately, the example involves a misunderstanding. If we interpret
"bring about" as meaning "consciously and intentionally bring about," then
it's abundantly clear that the PEPs are false. But I had no such meaning in
mind in setting up these principles; this should have been clear from my
saying that "brings about" is entailed by, though weaker than, "causes."5
When Socrates' jailor gave Socrates the poison, he brought about Xantippe's
becoming a widow-whether or not he knew that Socrates was married. And
in practicing gratuitous cruelty we bring it about that God is displeased with
us, whether or not we are aware of the fact. So this counterexample also fails.
The third counterexample proceeds from the assumption that some counterfactuals of freedom are true. 6
Consider one such proposition, If my son asked me for an apple I would not
give him poison. Let us symbolize this proposition as A > -Po In Lewis's
account of counterfactuals, this proposition is (nonvacuously) true as long as
there is some world in which A is true and P is false that is closer to the
actual world than any world in which A is true and P is true. All possible
worlds can be ranked according to their degree of similarity to the actual
world. Take the set of worlds closer to the actual world than the closest AlP
world. All of these worlds are AI-P worlds. Since this set of worlds is similar
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to at least a certain fixed degree to the actual world, they all have a certain
property in common that is lacking in all the AlP worlds. Call this property
¢. Now form the counterfactual conditional (A & ¢) > -Po This conditional
is necessarily true. In every world in which it is true that A and ¢, it is false
that P. This means, of course, that it is necessarily false that -[(A & ¢) > - Pl.
So as long as counterfactuals can be reduced to strict implications based on
comparative similarity of worlds in a Lewis manner, and as long as there are
true counterfactuals of freedom, there are also true strict implications of
freedom.

Zagzebski goes on to speculate that those counterfactuals of freedom which
are true are made to be true by the agents named in the counterfactuals:
That is, a counterfactual such as A > - P and the corresponding strict conditional are true because I would freely choose to make - P true in the requisite
circumstances. So I have the power to make it the case that (A & ¢) > -P
and I have the power to make it the case that -[(A & ¢) > -P] instead. But
the proposition -[(A & ¢) > - P] is strictly equivalent to 2 + 2 = 5. However,
I do not have the power to make 2 + 2 = 5 true. We have, then, another
counterexample to PEP 1 (pp. 114-15).
This argument contains a couple of logical slips which are not, however,
crucial to its soundness. First, it is not the case that all the worlds closer to
the actual world than the closest AlP world are AI-P worlds; many of them
may rather be -A worlds. Second, note that Zagzebski's formula '(A & ~) >-P'
is, strictly speaking, ill-formed, since 'A' stands for a proposition and '~' for
a property. To remedy this, let's use 'Prop(~)' to stand for that proposition
which is true of a given world just in case ~ is a property of that world. And
now Zagzebski's claim is that (A & Prop(~» > -P is a necessary truth, but
one which is brought about by the agent.
Does her argument succeed? What exactly is the proposition which we are
representing by 'Prop(~)'? A little reflection suggests the following:
Prop(¢) =df Things are more like they are in the actual world than they are
in any AlP world.
So far, so good. But

Prop(~)

entails a somewhat simpler proposition, namely

Prop(¢)' =df Things are different than they are in any AlP world.
But this, in turn, is equivalent to
Prop(¢)" =df -(A & P).
So (A & Prop(~» entails (A &-(A & P»-and it should be no surprise that
(A & Prop(~» > -P is a necessary truth, one which in no way owes its truth
to the agent of the counterfactual. And if we let '\jI' designate the property
of being more similar to the actual world than any world in which A & - P
is true, then (A & Prop(\jI» > P will also be a necessary truth, but one which
owes nothing to what Zagzebski would do when her son asked her for an
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apple. That is to say: there are "true strict implications of freedom" corresponding not only to all true counterfactuals of freedom, but to all the false
ones as well!
In conclusion, then, I welcome Zagzebski's recognition that the power
entailment principles make things uncomfortable for theological compatibilists. But if she and her fellow compatibilists are going to undermine those
principles, they have some work to do.

Huntington College
NOTES
1. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. (Page references in the text are to this
volume.)
2. This principle is originally due to Thomas Talbott. For more on the power entailment
principles, see my God, Time, and Knowledge (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989),
pp. 104-15.
Zagzebski also considers two other PEPs. But her counterexamples apply to all threeand in general, if there are counterexamples to one of the PEPs there will be counterexamples to all of them. So in the interests of conciseness, I will limit myself to the one
given in the text.
3. For other criticisms of the PEPs, see David Basinger, "Middle Know ledge and Human
Freedom: Some Clarifications," Faith and Philosophy 4 (1987), pp. 330-36; my reply is
found in "Reply to Basinger on Power Entailment," Faith and Philosophy S (1988), pp.
87-90; Thomas Flint, "In Defense of Theological Compatibilism," Faith and Philosophy
8 (1991), pp. 237-43; reply in God, Time, and Knowledge, pp. 104-15; Thomas Flint,
"Hasker's God, Time, and Knowledge," Philosophical Studies 60 (1990), pp. 103-15; reply
in "Response to Thomas Flint," Philosophical Studies 60 (1990), pp. 117-26.
4. I want to thank Philip Quinn for suggesting to me the point made in this paragraph.
S. See God, Time, and Knowledge, pp. IOS-7.

6. Zagzebski's view is that there are some true counterfactuals offreedom, but not nearly
as many of them as are required by the theory of middle knowledge.

